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LEGALIZATION OF GAY MARRIAGE—UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT DECLARES IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
STATES TO DENY SAME-SEX COUPLES THE RIGHT TO
MARRY: IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF GAY MARRIAGE IN
NORTH DAKOTA
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
ABSTRACT
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the United States Supreme Court held the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords same-sex
couples the fundamental right to marry. Additionally, the Court held
because the right to marry is fundamental, a State cannot refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state. The
Court illustrated four main reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution. First, the Court found the right of personal choice regarding
marriage is an integral part of a person’s individual autonomy. Second, the
right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike
any other. Third, the right to marry is a safeguard for families and their
children, which connects it to similar fundamental rights. Last, an
individual’s right to marry is a keystone of the nation’s social order.
Obergefell expands the rights of same-sex couples and allows them to
obtain the rights and privileges incorporated in marriage. However, it may
create potential issues with how North Dakota government officials execute
their duties because of their personal religious standing.
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I.

FACTS

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee laws defined marriage as a
union between one man and one woman.1 The petitioners, fourteen samesex couples and an additional two men whose same-sex partners were
deceased, challenged those states’ laws as unconstitutional.2
The
respondents were “the state officials responsible for enforcing the laws in
question.”3 “The petitioners claim[ed] the respondents violate[d] the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry” and refusing to
recognize their lawful marriages performed out of state.4
The respondents argued the institution of marriage should remain the
same.5 To them, if same-sex couples could obtain the lawful status of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2594.
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marriage, it would demean the institution itself.6 In the respondents’ view,
marriage, by its nature, is an opposite-gender union between man and
woman.7 On the contrary, the petitioners’ concern was with the importance
of marriage within society.8 They acknowledged the historical purpose and
nature of marriage.9 However, their intent was not to degrade the
institution, but rather to participate in it and retain its privileges for their
own families.10
Initially, the petitioners filed these suits in their home states in the
respective United States district court.11 Each district court ruled in favor of
the petitioners.12 Respondents appealed these adverse decisions to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the
district court decisions.13 The court of appeals held States have “no
constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages” or to recognize outof-state same-sex marriages.14 As a result, the petitioners sought certiorari
and the United States Supreme Court granted review.15
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Human history unveils the importance of marriage in maintaining order
in society.16 The union of two people promises nobility and dignity and
offers a unique fulfillment to the parties involved.17 The act of marriage
allows two people to find a particular type of life not feasible by
themselves.18 Historically, marriage in the United States has been based on
a union between two people of opposite sex.19 However, since the mid20th century, same-sex marriage in the United States has grown to become
a highly debated issue.20
Until the mid-20th century, most Western nations’ governments
condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral and criminal.21 Even after the
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2593.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2594.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2595.
20. Id. at 2596.
21. Id.
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awareness occurring after World War II, same-sex intimacy remained a
crime in many states.22 Additionally, during this time, gays and lesbians
could not obtain government jobs or join the military.23 In fact, when the
first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was published
in 1952, the American Psychiatric Association classified homosexuality as
a mental disorder.24
However, following significant cultural and political developments in
the late 20th century, same-sex couples began living more open and public
lives.25 This led both governmental and private sectors to shift their
attitudes towards a greater tolerance of homosexuals.26 Therefore,
questions about the rights of same-sex couples promptly reached the
courts.27
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court first considered the legal
status of homosexuals.28 In Bowers, the Court upheld a Georgia law, which
criminalized homosexual acts.29 About a decade later, the Court nullified
an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution, which essentially foreclosed any
state governmental entity from protecting against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.30 Further, in 2003, the Court overturned Bowers,
striking down “laws making same-sex intimacy a crime” because they
“demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.”31 As a result, the legal
question of same-sex marriage grew out of this discussion.32
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which defined
marriage as an exclusive union between one man and one woman.33
However, individual states began to reach different conclusions.34 For
example, in 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that
its state constitution “guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry.”35
Further, in 2013, the United States Supreme Court invalidated Congress’s

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
Id.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596.
Id. at 2597.
Id.
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 344 (2003).
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Defense of Marriage Act in Windsor.36 Since Windsor, the United States
Courts of Appeals have written several cases concerning same-sex
marriage.37 These cases have held excluding same-sex couples from lawful
marriage violates the Federal Constitution.38 In addition, the states are
currently divided on the issue of same-sex marriage.39 Therefore, the
United States Supreme Court granted the petitioners’ writ for certiorari.
III. ANALYSIS
In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy
writing for the majority,40 ruled the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution affords same-sex
couples the same rights as opposite-sex couples with regard to marriage.41
Since the founding of the United States, the institution of marriage and the
law have been part of an ever-changing American society.42 Initially,
marriage began as an arrangement by the couple’s parents, which stemmed
out of concerns based on politics, religion, and finances.”43 As time went
on, though, women have obtained many rights within marriage.44 This
example illustrated to the Court that American society is in a constant state
of change.45 The Court noted that the constant change in the institution of
marriage has strengthened it in its totality.46 Accordingly, the Court held
the Constitution affords same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry
based on four principles derived from precedent.47
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State
shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”48 The majority in Obergefell held that under the Fourteenth

36. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2595-96 (2013) (holding the Defense of
Marriage Act degrades same-sex couples and their families who seek the multiple benefits of
marriage).
37. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2593.
41. Id. at 2604-05.
42. Id. at 2596.
43. Id. at 2595.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2596.
47. Id. at 2599.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Amendment same-sex couples possess a fundamental right to marry due to
four reasons.49
1. Individual Autonomy
First, the Court held there is a connection between an individual’s
personal choice regarding marriage and his or her concept of individual
autonomy.50 Additionally, the Court noted Loving invalidated interracial
marriage bans under the Due Process Clause because of this connection
between marriage and individual liberty.51 According to the Court, “[l]ike
choices concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and
childrearing, all of which are protected by the Constitution, decisions
concerning marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can
make.”52 To the majority, there is nobility in the bond between two
individuals who, in their own autonomy, seek to have a family and be a part
of society, regardless of whether it is two men, two women, or one man and
one woman.53
2. Two-Person Union
Second, the Court held “that the right to marry is fundamental because
it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance” to the
people in the union.54 This principle is illustrated in Griswold, where the
Court held that a married couples’ right to use contraception is
fundamental.55 Additionally, in Turner, the Court held that the denial of the
right to marry to prisoners was unconstitutional because even individuals in
prison, who seek committed relationships, fulfilled the basic principles as to
why marriage is a fundamental right.56 These principles include emotional
support, public commitment, spiritual guidance, and government benefits.57
Furthermore, the Court in Lawrence held “same-sex couples have the
same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association.”58 More

49. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607-08.
50. Id. at 2589.
51. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). In Loving, the Court held that
miscegenation statutes adopted by Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the
basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 388 U.S. at 2.
52. Id. at 2599 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)).
56. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987)).
57. Id. at 2599-601.
58. Id. at 2600 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003)).
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specifically, the Court in Lawrence “invalidated laws [which] made samesex intimacy a criminal act.”59 To the Court, because Lawrence extended
this dimension of freedom, it only makes sense that the freedom does not
stop there.60 Therefore, this example illustrates the Court’s willingness to
expand the definition of liberty with respect to marriage because of its
importance to the individuals involved.
3. Family Fundamental Rights
Third, the right to marry is fundamental because it provides a safeguard
for children and their families, which is related to similar rights regarding
childrearing, procreation, and education.61 Legal recognition of a marriage
allows children to understand the closeness and importance of their own
family.62 Additionally, marriage is in the best interests of children because
it allows for permanency and stability.63
Barring same-sex couples from marriage conflicts with the chief
principal promoted by the right to marry. 64 Children are stigmatized by
believing their families are someway lesser if their same-sex parents are
prohibited from marriage.65 Also, children suffer material costs of being
raised by unmarried parents, which in turn demotes their way of life.66
Therefore, the Court noted the marriage laws at issue in Obergefell harm
and potentially demean the children of same-sex couples.67
4. Social Order
Last, the fundamental right to “marriage is a keystone of the [United
States’] social order.”68 For example, in Maynard, the Court explained that
marriage is the foundation of society, which without it, “there would be
neither civilization nor progress.”69 As a result, the Court noted that

59. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
60. Id. at 2600.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
63. Id. (citing Brief for Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 22, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556, 14-562,
14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1088972).
64. Id. at 6-7.
65. Id. at 29-31.
66. Id.
67. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
68. Id.
69. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211. (1888).
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marriage has changed throughout time, “superseding rules related to
parental consent, gender, and race once thought by many as essential.”70
When same-sex couples are denied the benefits, recognition, and
stability of marriage, the harm results in more than just material problems.71
Denying them the right to marry leads couples and their families to believe
they are somewhat inadequate and unstable.72 In addition, as States make
marriage more significant by attaching benefits to it, it is much more
important to allow homosexual couples to partake in its practices.73
5. Majority’s Conclusion
Accordingly, the four principles listed by the Court lead to the decision
that the right to marry is fundamental and that under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment two people of the
same sex may exercise their right to marry.74 In concluding its analysis, the
Court noted the petitioners’ wish to respect the institution of marriage and
to find its fulfillment for themselves.75 Additionally, the Court indicated
the petitioners did not seek to disrespect marriage.76 Therefore, the Court
held same-sex couples possess and may exercise their fundamental right to
marry, and the States cannot refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex character.77
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Four Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts,78 Justice Scalia,79
Justice Thomas,80 and Justice Alito,81 wrote dissents in Obergefell.
Although they all disagree with the majority for different reasons, their
common denominator rests in the notion that the determination of the
definition of marriage rests with the individual citizens of the states, and not
the nine justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2604-05.
Id. at 2608.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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1. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent
In the first Obergefell dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, in which Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined, wrote about his concerns with the Court
overstepping the legislative process.82 According to Roberts, “But this
Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should
be of no concern to us.”83 Further, Roberts noted that multiple States and
the District of Columbia have reviewed and amended their laws to allow
same-sex marriage.84 In his defense, Roberts recognized the compelling
pull of same-sex policy arguments, however, he rejected the legal
arguments in its favor.85 Put simply, because the Constitution does not
support any one theory of marriage, Roberts asserted that the people of each
state are required to determine its contours, not the Court.86
Roberts pointed to Justice Holmes’s dissent in 1905 in Lochner v. New
York, where the Court stated the Constitution “is made for people of
fundamentally differing views.”87 In Lochner, the Court invalidated a law
setting maximum hours for bakery employees based on its view that there
was “no reasonable foundation for holding it to be necessary or appropriate
as a health law.”88 Roberts noted that the Lochner dissent opposed the
majority on the basis that the law, which the majority struck down, could
have been viewed as the State’s reasonable response to its concern about
the bakery employees’ health.89 Specifically, the dissent in Lochner, which
Roberts agreed with, asserted that an individual Justice’s personal
preferences towards a case should not influence the final adjudication of a
constitutional issue.90 Therefore, as the case was clear to Justice Holmes in
1905, it was equally as clear to Roberts. To the Chief Justice, the majority
abandoned its position as an adjudicator, and answered a question before it,
“based not on neutral principles of constitutional law,” but on its individual
comprehension of what freedom is and what it will become in the future.91
Further, Roberts acknowledged that marriage has changed over time
through Supreme Court cases.92 However, he highlighted the fact that
82. Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 2612 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
88. Id. at 2617 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58).
89. Id. (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 72).
90. See id. (citing Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76).
91. Id. at 2612.
92. Id. at 2614.
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although the Court has molded aspects of marriage over time, it has not
altered its central essence as the union between one man and one woman.93
Additionally, Roberts stated, “Nowhere is the majority’s extravagant
conception of judicial supremacy more evident than in its description—and
dismissal—of the public debate regarding same-sex marriage.”94
Therefore, to Roberts the majority incorrectly enacted its own vision of
marriage.95 Furthermore, Roberts asserted that the democratic process is
the appropriate method for change in this case, rather than the courts.96
2. Justice Scalia’s Dissent
In the second Obergefell dissent, Justice Scalia, in which Justice
Thomas joined, wrote about his concern that the Court’s decision is a
“threat to American democracy.”97 Before the majority’s ruling, Scalia
viewed the “public debate over [gay] marriage as American democracy at
its best.”98 He noted “the electorates of 11 States . . . chose to expand their
[outdated] definition of marriage.”99 In sum, Scalia utilized a theory of
constitutional interpretation called originalism, with which he looks to the
framer’s original intent for constitutional questions and leaves the method
for change to formal constitutional amendments.100
Scalia utilized originalism when he looked to the history of the
Constitution and the time period in which it was created.101 More
specifically, he looked to the Fourteenth Amendment and its ratification in
1868.102 During this time, “every State limited marriage to one man and
one woman.”103 To Scalia, this resolved the definition of marriage and
whether the court possessed the power to extend it to same-sex couples.104
Additionally, because it is not expressly endorsed or prohibited by the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court possessed no grounds to strike
down state laws that defined marriage as only between opposite-sex
couples.105 To Scalia, the majority ruled incorrectly and demolished a
93. Id. at 2614-15 (“The majority may be right that the ‘history of marriage is one of both
continuity and change,’ but the core meaning of marriage has endured.”)
94. Id. at 2624.
95. Id. at 2625.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2627.
99. Id.
100. Originalism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2628.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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heated public debate over same-sex marriage.106 Therefore, Scalia would
have ruled in favor of the state statutes, which defined marriage as between
opposite-sex partners only.107 Moreover, Scalia would have allowed the
democratic process to continue in order to allow further public
understanding of the issue.108
3. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
In the third Obergefell dissent, Justice Thomas, in which Justice Scalia
joined, asserted that the Constitution’s definition of liberty has always been
implied as “freedom from government action, not entitlement to
government benefits.”109 Moreover, according to Thomas, the majority
incorrectly applied the Constitution to protect the latter definition of liberty,
which the Framers would not have acknowledged.110 As a result, because
Thomas believed that the majority’s decision ran afoul of the Constitution
and Declaration of Independence, and upset the country’s relationship
between the individual and State, he disagreed with the decision.111
Specifically, Thomas cited McDonald v. Chicago to illustrate his
concern with applying the Due Process Clause synonymously with
substantive rights.112 In McDonald, the Court determined “that the right to
keep and bear arms applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is ‘fundamental’ to the
American ‘scheme of ordered liberty.’”113 Further, in McDonald, Thomas
explained that although he agreed with that explanation of the fundamental
right, he disagreed that the right should be administered through the Due
Process Clause.114 To Thomas, it was inappropriate to enforce a right
“against the States through a Clause that speaks only to ‘process.’”115
Similarly, in Obergefell, Thomas argued that the majority incorrectly
applied the Due Process Clause in place of a more appropriate and
democratic solution.116

106. Id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811-12 (2010).
113. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (“By straying from the text of the Constitution,
substantive due process exalts judges at the expense of the People from whom they derive their
authority.”).
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Additionally, Thomas noted that to the majority, the state laws in
question divest the petitioners of their “liberty.”117 However, according to
Thomas, the word “liberty” in the Due Process Clause “most likely refers to
“the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person
to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct; without
imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.”118 Therefore, with
this definition in mind, Thomas reasoned the word “liberty” in the Due
Process Clause does not extend to the “type of rights claimed by the
majority.”119 In conclusion, Thomas stressed the distinction that both the
Constitution and Declaration of Independence established that an
individual’s liberty should be shielded from the State, not provided by it.120
4. Justice Alito’s Dissent
In the last Obergefell dissent, Justice Alito, in which Justices Scalia
and Thomas joined, expressed his concerns with the majority’s decision and
whether the Constitution adequately answers the question regarding samesex marriage.121 According to Alito, the Constitution leaves that question
to be decided by the people of each state.122 In Washington v.
Glucksberg,123 the Court has held liberty under the Due Process Clause only
protects those rights that are “[o]bjectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.”124 Deeply rooted rights are rights that are implicit to
the concept to liberty and which “[n]either liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.”125 To Alito, the majority ignored the lack of “deep
roots” for same-sex marriage and improperly claimed “the authority to
confer constitutional protection upon [a] right simply because they
believe[d] that it [was] fundamental.”126 In conclusion, Alito supported his
claim by stating that the Constitution says nothing about marriage.
Therefore, according to him, the States have the right to define marriage
how they see fit.127

117. Id. at 2632.
118. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
130 (1769)).
119. Id. at 2634.
120. Id. 2639-40.
121. Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
124. Id. at 721 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
125. Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
126. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640-41.
127. Id.
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IV. IMPACT
Although a relatively new case, Obergefell’s implications became
known shortly after the Court wrote the opinion. It essentially forces all
States to issue a marriage license at the request of a same-sex couple. As
anticipated, the decision created issues because of its substantial extension
of the definition of marriage. Specifically, in North Dakota, the
requirement that state and local governments issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples could conflict with some people’s religious beliefs.
Up until the Court decided Obergefell, North Dakota defined marriage
as between one man and one woman. North Dakota Century Code section
14-03-01 states:
Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between one man and one woman to which the consent of the
parties is essential. The marriage relation may be entered into,
maintained, annulled, or dissolved only as provided by law. A
spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or wife.128
In addition, shortly after the Court ruled on Obergefell, Governor Jack
Dalrymple publicly stated, “The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that samesex marriage is legal throughout the nation and we will abide by this federal
mandate.”129 However, some North Dakotans found the decision to conflict
with their religious beliefs. For example, recorders in two North Dakota
counties claim issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples substantially
interferes with their ability to do their jobs.130 The recorders relied on
religious objections when refusing to issue same-sex marriage licenses.131
However, both recorders found solutions to the problem and requested the
board of commissioners appoint a substitute official in instances of
applications for marriage licenses for same-sex marriages.132 Regardless of
these solutions, Obergefell’s implications immediately affected the people

128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2015).
129. John Hageman, Gov. Dalrymple Says North Dakota Will Abide Same-Sex Marriage
Mandate, INFORUM (June 26, 2015), http://www.inforum.com/news/3774663-gov-dalrymplesays-north-dakota-will-abide-same-sex-marriage-mandate.
130. Andrew Warnette, ND County Recorder Refuses to Issue Same-Sex Marriage Licenses,
INFORUM (July 7, 2015), http://www.inforum.com/news/3781560-nd-county-recorder-refusesissue-same-sex-marriage-licenses; Neil Carlson, County Official in Grafton Says No To Same Sex
Marriage Licenses, VALLEY NEWS LIVE (July 14, 2015), http://www.valleynewslive.com/home/
headlines/County-Official-In-Grafton-Says-No-To-Same-Sex-Marriage-Licenses-315012321.html.
131. Warnette, supra note 130; Carlson, supra note 130.
132. Warnette, supra note 130; Carlson, supra note 130.
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of North Dakota.133 Moreover, only time will tell how other North Dakota
counties will handle issues similar to the ones in Walsh and Stark County.
V. CONCLUSION
In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court held the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment affords same-sex couples
the fundamental right to marry. Additionally, the Court held because the
right to marry is fundamental, a State cannot refuse to recognize a lawful
same-sex marriage performed in another state. Obergefell expands the
rights of same-sex couples and allows them to obtain the rights and
privileges incorporated in marriage. However, it has created potential
issues with how North Dakota government officials execute their duties
because of their personal religious standing. To that end, North Dakota will
not know the full effects of Obergefell until the legal system has had
adequate time and exposure to the new law.
Tyler Erickson*

133. Warnette, supra note 130; Carlson, supra note 130.
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